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Abstract: When insurance firms, energy companies, governments, NGOs, and other agents strive to manage
climatic risks, it is by no way clear what the aggregate outcome should and will be. As a framework for
investigating this subject, we present the LAGOM model family. It is based on modules depicting learning
social agents. For managing climate risks, our agents use second order probabilities and update them by means
of a Bayesian mechanism while differing in priors and risk aversion. The interactions between these modules
and the aggregate outcomes of their actions are implemented using further modules. The software system is
implemented as a series of parallel processes using the CIAMn approach. It is possible to couple modules
irrespective of the language they are written in, the operating system under which they are run, and the physical
location of the machine.
Keywords: Learning agents; heterogeneous expectations; climatic risks; modular modelling.
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I NTRODUCTION

The experience of the Kyoto protocol shows how
difficult it is to establish a plausible climate policy in the short-term (Michel [2004]). At the same
time even if the Kyoto protocol had been implemented quickly and successfully, it would be far
from solving the long-term challenge of climate
change (Hasselmann et al. [2003]). For the future
evolution of climate policy, it will be vital to develop complementary approaches to trigger a sustained process of social learning in the face of this
global challenge.
So far, scientific thinking about climate policy has
been mostly framed in terms of a single goal function that is assumed to be somehow appropriate for
humankind as a whole. We will call such a function
a Leviathan function, following Hobbes’ classical
view of a super-agent taking care of co-ordination
problems shared by society as a whole. In research
on climate policy, two kinds of Leviathan functions
are currently used. On the one hand, natural scientists often assume that some quantitative measure
of a stable climate can be given as a guideline for
policy-making. In this spirit, increases in global
mean temperature of 1/10 degree Celsius per decade
have been proposed as a limit for the stress ecosys-

tems can cope with (WMO [1988]). A total increase
of one to two degrees Celsius has been proposed as
an additional limit (Rijsberman and Swart [1990]).
The resulting goal function is pretty simple, yielding only one of two values – 1 and 0, or ’acceptable’
and ’inacceptable’ – for possible trajectories of the
climate system. On the other hand, economists often assume that a slightly more complex goal function is appropriate. In this case, a discounted timeintegral of global GDP is proposed as Leviathan
function. Climate change then is to be avoided to
the extent to which it lowers GDP. Non-market effects are taken into account by monetary correction
terms, sometimes including highly controversial estimates of different economic values of human lives
in different countries.
In the future, it will be increasingly important to
model the climate problem in a multi-agent setting
where different goal functions are associated with
different agents. As Tesfatsion [2003] argues, agent
based computational economics has reached a degree of maturity where this seems a feasible goal.
However, two kinds of challenges have to be met
if useful insights are to be obtained. The first kind
arises from the need to identify and represent social
agents in a suitable way (section 2). The second is
the need to find a reasonable representation of learning processes in the face of far-reaching uncertain-

ties (section 3). On this basis, it is possible to gain
substantial new insights on pitfalls and opportunities in the management of climate risks (section 4).
2

AGENTS

The definition of agents for the present purpose requires a balance between standard economic concepts of utility, probability, and constraints on one
hand, and more AI oriented concepts of rule following on the other hand (section 2.1). The design of
suitable modelling tools in turn requires a series of
choices about how to implement software agents in
a modular and integrated way (section 2.2).
2.1 Human agents
There are two major approaches for modelling human agents, be they individuals or organisations:
maximising expected utility and rule following.
In economics, the standard concept states that
agents do have preferences about the possible consequences of alternative choices. In practice (although not necessarily in theory) it is assumed that
these preferences can be represented by an ordinal
utility function. When confronted with an uncertain
outcome from choices, agents are depicted as combining their preferences with their expectations for
the occurrence of different outcomes. This is represented by a cardinal utility function combined with
a probability distribution. Human agents are supposed to be able to identify and choose a single action which maximises their expected utility under
constraints given by the situation they find themselves in.
In this approach, the agent’s attitude towards risk
can be handled in two ways. First, the shape of
the utility function can be used to represent risk
averse, neutral, or risk seeking behavior. Second,
when maximising utility, additional constraints can
be added to depict an agent’s behavior towards risk.
We use, for example, a non-ruin constraint stating a
maximally accepted probability for going into ruin.
In information sciences, agents are often conceived
as rule following entities. When confronted with a
decision situation, they choose an action using a set
of rules. These rules typically are if-then statements
which trigger an action once a condition is met. In
a decision situation, the core challenge for this approach is to come up with a single action as typically several conditions are met and the resulting
set of stated actions has more than just one element.

A standard mechanism to tackle this problem is to
attach weights to the rules and apply the one with
the highest weight. The weights themselves are adjusted in a learning process like the bucket brigade
mechanism suggested by Holland [1992].
These two ways of modelling the decision processes
of agents are most often perceived as alternatives.
We interpret them slightly differently. Each constraint of a maximisation problem can be interpreted
as a rule the agent has to obey. In the case of the
non-ruin constraint applied in our work, the rule is:
whatever you do, the probability of going into ruin
shall not exceed a specified threshold. The expected
utility then can be used to come up with a single action amongst those satisfying the rules relevant for
the situation at hand.
It is important to realise that even if each agent
comes up with a single action in a given situation,
this by no means implies the existence of a single
optimal equilibrium for the whole range of agents.
This hints at the potential richness of such a perspective as it opens up the way to hybrid models
achieving greater descriptive and normative content
by linking standard approaches of economics and of
information sciences.
2.2 Software Agents
Human agents can be modelled by suitable software
agents. We have done so with the model family
LAGOM (LAGOM is a Swedish word denoting a
sense of balance and harmony, perhaps akin to the
chinese ”Tao”). One way of designing the required
software agents is to look at them as functions linking specific data types. It is useful to think about the
building blocks of the program in terms of a hierarchy of such data types. At the most general level,
we can distinguish between perception types and action types. A human agent, then, is implemented as
a function whose domain consists of one or several
perception types while the range consist of one or
several action types.
In order to represent the uncertainties the agent
is faced with, a third data type is needed, namely
expectations. Human agents form expectations
by comparing a given state of affairs with their
previous expectations. Expectations are a state
variable of the agent in question. This is reminiscent of Turing machines, as these map a perception into an action on the basis of an inner state
which is redefined at each step of their operation.
Accordingly, we use functions mapping percep-

tions and expectations to actions and expectations:
Human Agent:
[[Perceptions], [Expectations]]
→ [[Actions], [Expectations]]
The perceptions of standard economic agents are
characterised by two data types: the prices found on
the market and the resources owned by the agent.
Their actions relate to two more types: supply quantities and demand quantitites. Economic agents can
then be further specified into firms and households
of various kinds. In a typical version of LAGOM,
the economic agents are producers, households, and
insurance companies. LAGOM relies on a general
purpose optimisation algorithm (produced by Dan
Ontanu, Bukarest, and Cezar Ionescu, Potsdam) that
can handle an extremely large class of optimisation
problems. In the future, additional modules may
implement ”fast and frugal” searching algorithms
needed to model choices of non-optimising agents
(Gigerenzer and Selten [2001]).
Human actions have consequences, and in social interactions these consequences depend on the actions
of several agents. This pattern can be modelled by a
second kind of software agent representing various
kinds of social and biophysical contexts. A context
can be implemented as a function mapping states
of affairs and actions into new states of affairs:
Context:
[[State of Affairs], [Actions]]
→ [State of Affairs]
The standard economic context is a market mapping supply and demand under given prices and a
given resource allocation into new prices, traded
quantities and the resulting resource allocation.
Finally, a third kind of software agent is needed to
get a fully specified model. These are the program
components enabling the software agents representing human agents and contexts to run in an appropriate way. They are bundled in a driver performing the following steps. First, the driver launches
the other modules as parallel processes. Second, it
gives to each one of them the addresses it is supposed to talk or listen to. All modules have variables
for input and output ports. The driver assigns values to these (modifying them at runtime if needed),
thereby making it easy to exchange modules of the
same kind in a plug and play mode. Third, the driver
listens to selected modules in order to relaunch a
next iteration until the goal of the simulation has
been reached. And finally, it shuts down the whole
process.

Figure 1 shows a typical LAGOM implementation
(producers have been left out to avoid overcrowding
the diagram, the expectation manager will be discussed in the next section). There are two layers
of communication between the different modules.
On one layer, the driver performs his business as
described above. On the other layer, the different
modules interact in a structured manner.

Stormy
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Figure 1: Scheme of typical LAGOM implementation.
In the present example, there is a climate module
(dubbed ”stormy weather” in the figure) that damages households and is observed by the expectation
manager and is influenced by actions of households.
The expectation manager helps insurers and households to up-date their respective – usually different –
expectations on the basis of new observations. The
Walras finder, representing the ”invisible hand” of
the market, finds prices matching demand and supply for weather insurance by running through a fast
(hence the short dashes) sequence of interactions
with households and insurers. LAGOM operates at
multiple time scales. Market interchanges can be
and usually are much faster than climate change.
Industrial production introduces a third time scale,
usually lying between those two. By running a set
of such agents recursively – i.e., feeding their output
of step n as input into step n+1 – one gets a dynamic
system. Computer experiments with LAGOM have
shown that this format can be used to represent economic agents according to standard economic theory. An economic equilibrium then is a fixed point
of the recursive mapping defined above. In systems
with several fixed points, non-equilibrium dynamics
can obtain when the initial conditions are not identical to a fixed point. They are particularly interesting
when combined with some stochastic process (Haas
[2001]).
The design pattern of LAGOM is based on the
CIAMn software platform (CIAMn is an acronym

for ”Community Integrated Assessment Modules to
the power of n” and refers to a software platform
that we developed together with other researchers
at PIK and in the broader context of the European Climate Forum – cf. the link ”CIAMn ” at
<www.european-climate-forum.net>). The platform combines an understanding of software management as a social process (Jaeger et al. [2002])
with a logical analysis of the plurality of domains
of discourse required for integrated assessment
modelling (Jaeger [2003]). It provides algorithms
for coupling modules programmed in a dynamical simulation mode with modules programmed
in intertemporal optimisation mode – a key problem when combining natural science and economic
models (Leimbach and Jaeger [2004]).
Using this platform requires the user to do three
things: assign each piece of code to exactly one
module, provide a driver module suitable for the
problem at hand, and program input and output
to each module according to a shared protocol for
typed data transfer – TDT.
The TDT protocol (see the CIAMn link indicated
above as well as www.pik-potsdam/˜linstead) provides a simple way of handling input and output
to each module by means of two functions, one
for writing and one for reading. These functions
take addresses as parameters and work across different programming languages, different operating
systems, and different machines in different physical locations. Computer experiments with LAGOM
and other models have shown that drivers using this
protocol can effectively co-ordinate highly heterogeneous multi-agent systems.
3

BAYES

As mentioned above, human agents often act on the
basis of expectations that they try to improve in the
course of action. To model such processes of expectation formation, some kind of Bayesian reasoning
is needed.
A reasonable management of climatic risks is impossible without some way of making the relevant
expectations of various agents – including scholars engaged in climate research – explicit. With
LAGOM, we tackle this problem in two steps. First,
we represent heterogeneous expectations of a variety of agents, accepting that they may have perfectly
reasonable ways to entertain different expectations.
Second, given these expectations, we model how
learning agents can update their expectations on the

basis of further experience. Whether this updating
will lead to converging expectations, and if so, at
what speed, then becomes a question amenable to
scientific inquiry.
For this purpose, it is necessary to consider not
only frequentist probabilities, but also guesses about
them. Every child learns to deal with relative frequencies: it learns to distinguish fast rythms from
slow ones, it learns that certain teams win more
often than other ones, it learns to roll a dice, etc.
Relative frequencies can be observed, they can be
forecast, and they matter for many actions. The
mathematics of probability measures can be used
to deal with relative frequencies where a more indepth analysis is required. Probabilities then appear as limits of relative frequencies defined over
sequences of events.
Children also learn to make guesses about things
they do not know, and to take action on the basis of
such guesses – one may guess that a certain branch
of a tree will not crack and climb on it, etc. Often, guesses have nothing to do with relative frequencies, as when one guesses what is the capital of
some foreign country. But sometimes, we need to
take action in the face of a situation where unknown
relative frequencies matter. In these cases, guesses
about frequentist probabilities occur.
The mathematics of probability measures turns out
to be helpful for analysing guesses about frequentist
probabilities, too. This is due to a result known as de
Finetti’s theorem (see Bernardo and Smith [1994]
for an exposition). The theorem shows how an unknown probability distribution can be approximated
if additional samples become available step by step.
For practical purposes, an important point is that the
approximation can start from very different initial
guesses as long as these guesses do not exclude the
limiting distribution.
To apply this framework, one must distinguish between first order and second order probabilities and
consider updating schemes for the latter ones. If
two possibilities are given with unknown probabilities, then the relevant first order probabilities are
given by the open interval (0,1). Complete ignorance then implies a distribution of second order
probabilities corresponding to the probability density function y=1 over this interval.
An agent can improve upon this initial distribution
under two conditions. First, she must be able to
gather additional evidence. Second, she must have
some opinion about the structure of the underlying

process, which may be quite complex. If she is
willing to consider key parameters of the process as
characterized by some unknown frequentist probability, then the following updating scheme can be
shown to be efficient.
p2,t+1 (pi (s))
=

pi (s)
.
(p
(p
(s))
· pi (s))dpi (s)
2,t
i
i∈I

p2,t (pi (s)) · R

p2 stands for second order probabilities, t for time,
p for first order probabilities, P for the set of all
first order probabilities suitably indexed by an index
set I, pi for a specific member of the set of first order
probabilities, and s for a specific situation obtained
at time t out of a set of all possible events S.
In LAGOM, this updating mechanism has been implemented in a separate module, the expectation
manager. It may be used as a skeleton for representing scientific communities along with mass-media
amplifying their claims, as both decision-makers
and the general public up-date their expectations
concerning climate change by interacting with these
institutions.
The updating process is similar to the formula
known as Bayes’ rule. But there is an important difference between Bayes’ rule as applied to a
static situation and this dynamic updating process.
In a static situation, Bayes’ rule follows immediately from the definition of conditional probabilities. The updating mechanism introduced above can
be shown to be efficient for dynamic processes with
a limiting frequentist probability, but this is far from
being trivial.
Therefore, it is important to notice that the model
design used for the updating of expectations in
LAGOM can also be applied to non-Bayesian updating schemes, as when one agent imitates the behavior of another one.
4

C LIMATIC R ISKS

The various IPCC publications (for an overview see
Watson [2001]) are the authoritative source on climatic risks. They show beyond reasonable doubt
that humankind is altering the global climate system in ways that can lead to serious damages to humans and to things they value – by sea-level rise,
droughts, floods, storms, and the like. These publications derive their authority to a considerable ex-

tent from the fact that their production is controlled
by a carefully crafted consensus-building mechanism. This, however, makes it impossible to reach
an in-depth assessment of these risks. There are
two reasons for this state of affairs: the difficulty
to reach an agreement on the value to be attached
to non-marketable goods like human lives or the
beauty of coral reefs, and the difficulty to reach an
agreement on the likelihood to be attached to events
without statistical track record.
A good example for these difficulties as well as for
their importance is the Pentagon study on abrupt climate change (Schwartz and Randall [2003]). The
study considers the possibility that anthropogenic
climatic change will lead to a shut-down of the thermohaline ocean circulation in the North Atlantic.
It does so by taking as an analog a similar shift in
ocean currents that occurred about 8.000 years ago,
looking at its effects then, and asking what might be
the worst conceivable implications of these events
in today’s world. This leads to scenarios of social
turmoil and international tensions, including violent
conflict and dramatic losses of welfares in Europe
and North America. Similar scenarios, geared to
events like shifting monsoon patterns, melting permafrost, intensified El Nino events, and the like, can
be produced for other parts of the world. While the
available evidence is sufficient to reach agreement
on the fact that these scenarios describe possible
courses of events, there is no way to attach any frequentist probability measures to them; nor is there
a meaningful Leviathan function providing the one
and only yardstick for the evaluation of such risks.
With the model of learning agents presented in this
paper, another approach is feasible: One can study
the options of agents acting on the basis of heterogeneous expectations and evaluations in the face of
climatic risks. In particular, one can study to what
extent their expectations may converge on the basis of additional evidence and what sort of compromise they may find in order to reduce the risks
about which they care most. While it is extremely
unlikely that problems of this kind have a single optimal solution, it is almost certain that stepwise improvements can be achieved through a combination
of negotiations and learning by doing.
Along these lines, the model can be used to study
the management of climatic risks without the need
to assume an unwarranted Leviathan function. This
is not to say that no agent can play the role of
Hobbes’ Leviathan. Quite the opposite, the model
can be used to study how a specific agent may
acquire that role, which is then not assumed, but

explained. The model can also be used to study
multilateral constellations where climate risks are
managed without any agent assuming the Leviathan
role. Simulations show that such constellations are
hardly ever characterised by a single fixed point of
the relevant dynamics. Therefore, a multilateral solution of the climate problem will need to rely on
some selection mechanism, most likely of the kind
described by Schelling as a focal point (Schelling
[1960]).
This state of affairs implies that processes of supply
and demand – even if amended by instruments like
carbon taxes and emissions permits – will be insufficient to bring about a solution. For this purpose,
economic mechanisms and policy instruments must
be complemented by suitable processes of expectation formation. While Bayesian learning is by no
means the only mechanism of this kind, it provides
a useful starting point for multi-agent modelling of
climate risks.
5

C ONCLUSION

Modular multi-agent models representing learning
agents faced with climatic risks are both desirable
and feasible. They are desirable because climate
risks are not amenable to a purely frequentist analysis and because the use of a Leviathan function
dodges the question of how to reach agreement over
the valuation of non-marketable goods. They are
feasible because software tools are available to couple highly heterogeneous software agents, because
mathematical concepts like second-order probabilities can be used to represent learning agents, and
because the scientific evidence on climatic risks is
sufficient to identify salient risks. In addition, modular modelling has the advantage of facilitating cooperation between researchers with different fields
of expertise, thereby improving the reliability of the
resulting computations.
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